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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff... can prove he was free from contributory negligence
merely because the passenger who sued him in the first action was
unable to establish his negligence by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence." 1' Thus, although plaintiff might be entitled to partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of defendant's negligence,1 8 he would
have the burden of proving his own freedom from contributory negli-
gence, and if the evidence were evenly balanced, defendant would be
entitled to judgment in his favor.
CPLR 3213: Surety's labor and material bond deemed not to consti-
tute an instrument for the payment of money only.
Although CPLR 3213 has already been the subject of three amend-
ments, it is not yet clear what is encompassed by the phrase "instrument
for the payment of money only." 1 9 At least, that is the overall impres-
sion yielded by an examination of the cases arising under this section. 20
That a negotiable instrument qualifies as a presumptively meritorious
claim is certain.121 But, beyond this it is difficult to predict whether a
particular instrument will meet the court's definition of a money-only
instrument. Perhaps the most well-received criterion advanced thus far
is that an instrument is susceptible to 3213 treatment if a prima facie
case is established by proof of the instrument and a failure to make the
payments prescribed thereunder. 22
In Kipp Brothers, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.123
the Supreme Court, Westchester County, ruled that a labor and ma-
terial bond executed by defendant as surety is not the type of instru-
ment envisioned by the draftsmen of CPLR 3213. The court reasoned
that although plaintiff had a direct action against the surety, the latter's
obligation was secondary to the principal's duty of performance and
only arises when the principal breaches its obligation. Since proof of
facts extraneous to the bond would thus be necessary to establish a
117Id. at 959, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
118 CPLR 3212 (e); cf. De Paul v. George, 34 App. Div. 2d 620, 309 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Ist
Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 342, 358 (1970).
119 The construction problems arising under CPLR 3213 are due in part to the fact
that similar relief did not exist under the CPA. In addition, the legislative reports on the
section are silent as to what instruments the section was intended to encompass. See FiRsT
REr. 91; FIFrH REP. 492; SIXTH REP. 338.
120 For a discussion of cases arising under this section, see H. PETE-,REUND & J. Mc-
LAUGHLN, NEw YoRK PRArICE 860 (2d ed. 1968); The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv., 359, 160 (1970); The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 335 (1969).
121 Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.2d
752 (Ist Dep't 1968).
122 Id.
123 63 Misc. 2d 788, 314 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1970).
[Vol. 45:500
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
prima facie case the court properly concluded that a 3215 motion did
not lie.
AxTncLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMNTS
CPLR 5208: Sheriff is permitted to sell real property after judgment
debtor's death provided that execution was issued before death.
CPLR 5208 provides that "after the death of a judgment debtor,
an execution upon a money judgment shall not be levied upon.. . any
property in which he has an interest, nor shall any enforcement proce-
dure be undertaken with respect to such . . . property, except upon
leave of the surrogate's court." In Oysterman's Bank & Trust Co. v.
Weeks,124 the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that as long
as an execution on real property has been issued before the death of the
judgment debtor, CPLR 5208 does not prevent the completion of the
enforcement procedure by publication and sale after the judgment
debtor's death.
In Oysterman's a judgment was entered against defendant, Weeks,
on August 1, 1968, and was docketed in Suffolk County one week later.
On December 13, 1968, an execution was issued to the sheriff of Suffolk
County against defendant's interest in certain real property which was
situated there. Defendant died on May 18, 1969. When the sheriff ad-
vertised the property for sale in September of 1969, the instant proceed-
ing was commenced to stay the sale.125
The court focused on two phrases contained in CPLR 5208: "an
execution.., shall not be levied upon"'126 and no "enforcement pro-
cedure shall be undertaken." With regard to the first phrase, the court
was convinced that the sheriff was not attempting to levy on the execu-
tion. Since a judgment is a lien upon real property in the county where
it is docketed, 27 it was not necessary for the sheriff to make a formal
levy before he sold the property. 28 With regard to the second phrase,
the court reasoned that the sheriff had not undertaken any enforcement
124 85 App. Div. 2d 580, SIS N.Y.S.2d 535 (2d Dep't 1970).
125 If prior law is adopted, an attempt at sale in contravention of section 5208 will be
treated as a nullity. 6 WK&M 5208.10, citing Prentiss v. Bowden, 145 N.Y. 342, 40 N.E.
13 (1895).
126 As originally proposed, the phrase read thusly: "an execution upon a money judg-
ment shall not be issued... "Ta RP. 126. The wording of the section was altered in
an attempt to resolve problems raised in Wood v. Morehouse, 45 N.Y. 368 (1871). FINAL
REP. A-198. In Wood the Court of Appeals ruled that the death of the judgment debtor
after an execution had been issued would not affect its validity. It should be noted, how-
ever, that Wood was limited to the facts at hand: the case involved realty and the sheriff
had commenced sale proceedings prior to the debtor's death. 6 WK&M 5208.05.
127 CPLR 5203(a).
128 Wood v. Colvin, 5 Hill 228 (1843); see also 9 CAMr)OY-WArr 2D CYCLOPEDIA OF
NEw YoRK PRActicE § 64:159 (1966).
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